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ABSTRACT 
If individuals and society both obey the expected utility 
hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social 
utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, 
provided the society is indifferent when all its members are, This 
result was first proven by Harsanyi [4] who made implicit assumptions 
in the proof not actually needed for the result (see [5]) , This note 
presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyi's theorem based on a 
separating hyperplane argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Harsanyi [4, Theorem V] states his well-known utilitarian 
cardinal welfare theorem which provides conditions under which the 
social utility is a weighted sum of individual utilities and which has 
often been cited as a justification of classical utilitarianism. The 
validity of this result has recently called into question by Resnick 
[5], Resnick rightfully points out that Harsanyi's proof uses 
implicit assumptions which may not be satisfied in many of the 
situations where one would like to apply the theorem. Fishburn [3] 
has pointed out that nonetheless the result is true and that Resnick's 
counterexample is actually a counterexample to a claim which is 
stronger than Harsanyi's actual claim. In this paper we present an 
alternative proof of Harsanyi's theorem which is considerably 
different from Fishburn's. While the details of the proof are 
somewhat technical, the structure of the proof is straightforward and 
interesting in its own right. 
There is a set X of basic social alternatives, but rankings 
must be made over lotteries on X, that is, countably additive 
probability measures defined on a a-field n of subsets of X. 
Individuals and society are assumed to rank lotteries according to the 
expected utility hypothesis. That is, each individual i has a a-
measurable von Neumann-Morgenstein utility function ui : X -7 lR so 
that lottery µ is weakly preferred to lottery n if and only if 
fuidµ L Juidn. In order to guarantee the finiteness of these 
integrals we assume that all utilities are bounded. See Fishburn [2] 
for conditions sufficient to gaurantee this. Likewise there is a 
bounded a-measurable social utility w : X -7 lR used for ranking 
lotteries. Harsanyi's main result is that if the social utility is 
indifferent whenever all individuals are indifferent, then the social 
utility is an affine combination of the individual utilities. 
Formally we have the following result. 
Theorem: Let (X, a) be a measurable space and let ui, i  = 1, . . •  , n, and 
w be bounded real-valued a-measurable functions on X. Suppose that 
fwdµ = Jwdn whenever Juidµ = Juidn for all i 1, . • .  , n (1) 
for any countably additive probability measures µ, n on a. Then there 
(2) 
Proof: Let B denote the set of all bounded real-valued a-measurable 
functions on X and let S = span{1, u1, . . .  , un), where 1 is the constant 
function taking on the value 1. Let M be the set of countably 
additive signed measures on a. Each measure µ e M defines a linear 
functional on B by u 1-7 Judµ. Furthermore, since M contains 
countably additive measures of the form µx where µx(E) = { �
all 
if x t E 
if X B E, 
2 
3 
M separates the points of B. Thus the weak topology on B generated by 
M makes B a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space ([1, 
V. 3. 3]) . Since S is a finite dimensional subspace of B it is closed 
in any vector space topology ([6, 1. 3. 3]) . Suppose condition (2) 
fails. Then w t S and so we have by a separating hyperplane theorem 
([1, V. 3.12]) that there is some nonzero µ e M satisfying 
fwdµ ; 1 and Judµ ; 0 for all u e S. (3) 
Let µ ; µ+ - µ be the Jordan decomposition of µ [1, III. 1.8]. By (2) 
and the fact that ! e S we have 
Since µ is nonzero, µ+{X) µ-(X) f 0, so we can normalize µ+ and µ-
to be probabilities. 
(3) it follows that 
-+ 1 + Set µ ; -- µ and µ 
µ+(X) 
1, . . .  , n. 
Thus by (1) we must have that 
f -+ J -wdµ ; wdµ-. 
Then from 
(4) 
( 5) 
So that 1 0, a contradiction. 
Q. E.D. 
Remark: This proof offers no proof of the nonnegativity of the 
coefficients. This requires additional hypotheses such as may be 
found in Fishburn [3]. 
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